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Since the mid-1990s, the international imbalances have increased 
significantly with a large US current deficit facing Asian surpluses, mainly 
Chinese. Since 2007, a partial reduction of these imbalances has been 
obtained, largely thanks to production’s decreases, without large exchange 
rate adjustments. The Asian surpluses have remained important. The 
objective of this paper is to examine the exchange rate misalignments (ERM) 
of the main emerging countries in Asia and Latin America since the 1980s, 
so as to shed light on the 2000s by a long term analysis and compare with the 
industrialized countries’ case. Our results confirm that ERM have been 
reduced since the mid-2000s at the world level, but the dollar remained 
overvalued against the East Asian countries, except the yen. Chinese, Indian 
and Brazilian exchange rate policies have been much contrasted since the 
1980s. The Indian rupee has been more often overvalued while a more 
balance situation prevailed in Brazil only since the 2000s. The Latin 
American countries have faced wider and more dispersed ERM and current 
imbalances than East Asian countries. But Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
benefits now of undervalued currencies while Mexico is closer to equilibrium. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the international imbalances have increased significantly with a large US 
current deficit facing Asian surpluses, mainly Chinese. These imbalances reflect internal 
disequilibrium in each area, mainly American households’ over-indebtedness and the declining 
US competitiveness on one hand, the insufficient Chinese households’ consumption on the 
other hand. These imbalances have been lasting, partly thanks to the financial liberalization 
which has facilitated their financing. The present financial crisis has been the consequence of 
these imbalances. Since 2007, a partial reduction of these imbalances has been obtained, largely 
thanks to production’s decreases, without large exchange rate adjustments. However, the Asian 
surpluses have remained important. 
 
Exchange rates misalignments (ERM) have been studied in details in the literature using two 
main approaches: the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) and the Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER). They generally concluded that the dollar was overvalued 
and that the euro was undervalued during the first half of the 2000s. While these misalignments 
have been gradually reduced, the yuan remained undervalued since the second half of the 1990s. 
 
However less attention has been paid to emerging countries’ ERM where contrasted evolutions 
can be observed. In most of the Asian emerging countries large current surpluses have been 
observed after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. The oil producer countries have also benefited of 
important surpluses thanks to oil price’s increase. Many countries in Latin America and in 
Africa have, on the contrary, suffered of current deficits, although limited. These divergent 
evolutions between emerging countries reflect different choices relating to growth model and 
exchange rate regime. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the ERM of the main emerging countries in Asia and 
Latin America since the 1980s, so as to shed light on the 2000s by a long term analysis and 
compare with the case of industrialized countries.  
 
For this purpose, a FEER approach is implemented. The FEER is defined as the level of 
exchange rate which allows the economy to reach the internal and external equilibriums at the 
same time (Williamson, 1983). The internal equilibrium is defined as the full utilization of 
productive resources of a country without generating inflation pressures. The external 
equilibrium corresponds to a sustainable current account. 
 
In a first step, using a model of world trade, FEERs are estimated for the main currencies (the 
dollar, the euro, the yen, the yuan and the pound sterling). In a second step, FEERs can be 
estimated for each emerging country, using simple national models and linking the estimation 
of national FEERs to the multinational model’s results to get bilateral misalignments of each 
currency. 
 
Our results confirm that ERM have been reduced since the mid-2000s at the world level, but 
the dollar remained overvalued against the East Asian countries, except the yen. Chinese, Indian 
and Brazilian exchange rate policies have been much contrasted since the 1980s. The Indian 
rupee has been more often overvalued while a more balance situation prevailed in Brazil only 
since the 2000s. The Latin American countries have faced wider and more dispersed ERM and 
current imbalances than East Asian countries. But Argentina, Chile and Uruguay benefits now 
of undervalued currencies while Mexico is closer to equilibrium. 
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and methodological 
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background. Section 3 presents the multinational model and the national model used to estimate 
the FEERs. Section 4 provides estimates of the external and internal equilibriums but focuses 
mainly on external imbalances. Section 5 presents estimates of the FEER for the main 
currencies and for emerging currencies. A last section concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical and methodological background 
 
ERM is defined as the gap, in percentage, between observed exchange rates and equilibrium 
exchange rates. Various methodologies can be used to estimate equilibrium exchange rates. 
 
2.1 Equilibrium exchange rates methodologies 
 
The PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) is the oldest one and simplest methodology to estimate 
equilibrium exchange rates. In order to explain movements of equilibrium exchange rates, this 
simple approach only relies on the relative prices. It ignores, however, other structural factors 
and seems too schematic, even when completed by a Balassa-Samuelson effect. Beyond the 
PPP hypothesis, we have two distinct methodologies to produce equilibrium exchange rates, as 
it is pointed in Driver and Westaway (2004), approaches based on models and approaches based 
on estimations. Typically, approaches based on models (complete macroeconomic models or 
partial equilibrium models of world trade) produce Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates, 
initially introduced by Williamson (1983), and approaches based on econometrical estimations 
produce Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rates, firstly introduced by Clark and MacDonald 
(1998). In spite of several variants of FEERs (especially for the estimation of the current 
account target) and BEERs (for the choice of econometrical methodology and of fundamental 
variables), these two types of approach are used in the overwhelming majority of studies on 
equilibrium exchange rates. The NATREX (Stein and Allen, 1997) methodology can be seen 
as a variety of the BEER approach.  
 
These two main theories of equilibrium exchange rates can be highlighted: 
 
a) The Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate and its recent developments (Cline, 2008): the 
FEER is defined as the exchange rate prevailing when the economy simultaneously reaches the 
external equilibrium (a sustainable current account determined by structural parameters) and 
the internal equilibrium (full utilization of the productive potential). This approach is based on 
a structural model which mainly describes foreign trade relations and relates explicitly 
movements of exchange rates to internal and external imbalances. 
 
b) The Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate is an econometric approach (Clark & 
MacDonald, 1998). The BEER approach explains the exchange rate dynamic with some main 
variables (usually the net foreign assets, the terms of trade, the productivity and the oil prices) 
which influence the real exchange rate at long term. A long term equation is first estimated by 
a co-integration method and then, using an error correction model, a short term equation is 
estimated. The ERM are simply measured by the gap between the observed exchange rate and 
its long run value.  
 
In a nutshell, we prefer the FEER approach because it is more explicitly articulated with the 
structural characteristics of each country and it ensures greater consistency of estimates across 
countries. But the FEER does not pretend to describe the modality of the return to the 
equilibrium. On the opposite, the BEER approach often suffers of too many variables added 
without clear justification and the long term value can hardly be regarded as an equilibrium 
one. 
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2.2 The FEER approach and the SMIM 
 
We conduct a two-step analysis (Jeong et al., 2010) in order to estimate the ERM, first at the 
world level for the main currencies (the dollar, the euro, the yuan, the yen and the pound 
sterling), second at the level of each emerging country. 
 
First, for the main currencies, the methodology used is a synthesis of previous works on the 
FEER (Borowski & Couharde, 2003; Jeong & Mazier, 2003) and of the Symmetric Matrix 
Inversion Method (SMIM) recently proposed by Cline (2008). A multinational model 
describing the foreign trade of the main countries and of the Rest of the World is used to 
calculate the main currencies’ equilibrium exchange rates. It is well known that in an n-country 
model there are only n-1 independent bilateral exchange rates, because the first country’s 
exchange rate (usually the dollar) is the numeraire against which the others are compared. 
Consequently, there is an overdetermination problem in the FEER approach, as there are more 
equations (current account targets) than unknowns (exchange rates). 
 
In this paper, we use the nth country as a residual in order to solve the overdetermination 
problem and to ensure the consistency of the world trade in volume and in value. Exports and 
imports of the residual country are calculated as residual of the world trade equilibrium in 
constant and current prices. To avoid such an asymmetric approach and following the SMIM 
approach, the six countries or areas (the United States, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, the 
Euro area and the Rest of the World) will be treated symmetrically by carrying out six sets of 
estimates with six multinational models where each country is treated successively as a residual. 
Instead of a simple average of the results, the solution adopted in this paper will be to use (as 
the estimate of the FEERs) the average of equilibrium exchange rates obtained from all the 
solutions, except the one for which the country in question is regarded as a residual (designated 
OCI for own country included). 
 
For each emerging country, an equilibrium exchange rate will be estimated using a simple 
national model of foreign trade. The equilibrium exchange rate will be defined, as previously, 
as the exchange rate compatible with the internal and external equilibriums of each country. It 
has been shown that, for a relatively small country, a national model gives results very close to 
the ones obtained with a multinational model where the studied country would be explicitly 
described (Jeong & Mazier, 2003). 
 
Lastly, based on studies of the medium-term determinants of current accounts (Faruqee & Isard, 
1998; Chinn & Prasad, 2003), the equilibrium current account are determined by estimating 
structural determinants of current account (the demographic features, the developmental stage, 
the public deficit, the net foreign assets, etc...) relying on panel regression techniques. 
 
3 Macroeconomic modeling 
 
3.1 The multinational model 
 
The model describes the trade structure of the main countries or areas, namely, the United 
States, Japan, China, the Euro area, the United Kingdom and the Rest of the World using 
standard foreign trade equations: export and import volume equations, export and import price 
equations. Each country is successively treated as a residual and in that case export and import 
volumes are determined as residual of the equations of world trade equilibrium in value and in 
volume while their export and import prices are determined in the same manner as for other 
trading partners. We notice that this multinational specification gives a full account of 
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interdependent effects in volume and prices of exports and imports of all countries. We 
incorporate a consumer prices equation to take into account the feedback effect between the 
consumer prices and the import prices. The real effective exchange rate is defined relatively to 
the consumption prices. Finally, the current account is defined as the trade balance augmented 
of debt service.  
 
In this framework, the FEERs are defined as the real effective exchange rates compatible with 
the simultaneous realization of the internal and external equilibriums at medium term of each 
trading partner. The internal equilibrium means that actual output follows the potential output 
and the external equilibrium means that actual current account corresponds to the sustainable 
current account at medium term. 
 
On the whole, each multinational model comprises 35 endogenous variables (x, m, px, pm, pd 
for the six countries or areas and the five bilateral exchange rates e) for 35 equations (x, m, b 
for the five countries other than the residual one, px, pm, pd for the six countries and the two 
world trade equilibrium equations). The real effective exchange rates are calculated ex post 
using bilateral exchange rates and consumer prices. 
 
3.2 The national model 
 
For each emerging country, except China, it is possible to estimate an equilibrium exchange 
rate using a foreign trade model in which the world demand and the world trade prices are 
exogenous. As explained above, it is not necessary for a relatively small country at the world 
scale to use a multinational model to estimate equilibrium exchange rates. The equations specify 
the trade volume and price equations for a small country facing world economy (the model is 
given in appendix 1). Solving this simplified model in logarithmic differential form gives r, the 
misalignment in real effective terms: 
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Where b is the difference between the observed current account and the equilibrium one, as 
percentage of GDP, d* is the world demand in volume and di is the internal demand in volume, 
written in logaritmic differential compared with the equilibrium, σpetx = EPpetMpet/PXX is the 
ratio of net oil imports on non-oil exports and σx = iEF/PXX is the ratio of foreign debt service 
on non-oil exports, μ the openness ratio and T the ratio of export to import. 
 
The FEER approach focuses on the real effective exchange rates. However, the nominal 
bilateral exchange rate against the dollar of each currency can be more intelligible. We can find 
out e, the degree of misalignment in bilateral nominal term; the partner countries’ 
misalignments are given by the previous multinational model: 
 
  i i ij j jj ie r px e    [2] 
 
We can also compute the effective ERM based on consumer prices: 
 
      1i i i i ij j j ij j jj i j irc m r pd e px e            [3] 
 
Where px is the global export price and pd is the consumer price. 
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3.3 Foreign trade elasticities 
 
Without doing original econometric work, trade equations are taken from existing estimations 
realized with specifications close to the standard model presented before. We use especially 
long-term elasticities. The main results are presented in appendix 2. Considering the uncertainty 
surrounding estimations, sensitivity tests to elasticity modifications are provided in appendix 3. 
The sensitivity to volume and price elasticities appears to be limited. 
 
4 External and internal equilibrium at medium term 
 
4.1 Estimation of equilibrium current account 
 
As current account equals the difference between domestic saving and investment, the current 
account equilibrium is examined from the perspective of the medium and long run determinants 
of saving and investment behaviors (Faruqee & Isard, 1998; Chinn & Prasad, 2003). According 
to these authors, the main determinants of the current account at medium term are: the 
demographic characteristics, such as, the dependency ratios of dependent populations relative 
to the working age population, which is expected to exert a negative influence, with a higher 
dependency ratio leading to more spending; the net foreign asset, which is expected to have a 
positive effect, due to the capital income resulting from it; the government budget balance, with 
a public deficit having a negative effect on the current account, but this effect may be regarded 
as a simple accounting one1 which should not to be introduced. Finally, we introduce the output 
gap, since a higher utilization of production capacity leads to a deterioration of the current 
account. 
 
The equations of current account are estimated with panel data for 1980-2003 period and for 
two groups of countries. In a medium term perspective, we use non-overlapping four years 
average of annual data in order to estimate medium run current account in which cyclical 
components have been washed out (Lee et al., 2008). Prolonged recession or boom can be 
observed over a period of four years in many countries, especially in the emerging countries 
where macro instability is greater. In order to estimate medium to long run trend of current 
account, we set the output gap at zero in the simulation of the current account. 
 
The variables of equation [4] are defined as follows: CA, current account as % of GDP; ISNFA, 
initial stock of net foreign assets at the beginning of each period of 4 years as % of GDP; CDR, 
child dependency ratio, population under the age of 15 years as % of population aged 15 to 64; 
ODR, old dependency ratio, population over the age of 65 years as % of population aged 15 to 
64; OG, output gap in % of the potential production. The sources of the different variables are 
presented in appendix 4.  
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4                 it i t it it it it itCA ISNFA CDR ODR OG                [4] 
 
 
One group is composed of 19 industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
                                                 
1 There are other variables, such as the openness ratio, which plays negatively, a higher openness meaning a greater 
possibility of assuring the debt service in the future, or the relative real GDP per capita, which exerts a non linear 
influence according to stages of development. We tried these variables, but results were not significant enough. 
Moreover, relative GDP per capita is evaluated non stationary by most of tests. 
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Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) and will be used for 
determining the current account targets of the United States, Japan, the Euro area, the United 
Kingdom and Korea. 
 
The other group, composed of 26 emerging economies (Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam), will be used for determining the current account target of 
China and other emerging countries2. 
 
The results of unit root tests are presented in appendix 5. As it can be seen, we reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in all the series by using the IPS test statistic (2003). 
 
For industrialized countries, the estimated coefficients of equation [4] are on the whole 
significant with the predicted signs (Table 1) in different specifications. The dependency ratios 
are not highly significant, although they are the best theoretically justified variables. Output 
gap turns out to have negative effects on current account. Country effects raise the 
determination ratio and reflect the existence of strong specificities between this large set of 
industrial countries. Time fixed effects are less relevant and contribute to deteriorate the quality 
of the estimation. On the whole the panel specification with country fixed effects seems the 
most relevant due to the prevailing specificities between the set of countries and is adopted in 
order to calculate the equilibrium current account.  
 
Table 1. Determinants of the current account for industrialized countries 
 
 OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects 
Constant 
6.69** 
(2.14) 
11.27*** 
(3.29) 
0.69 
(0.29) 
Initial Stock of Net 
Foreign Assets 
0.06*** 
(10.87) 
0.02** 
(2.22) 
0.07*** 
(8.51) 
Child Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.16** 
(-2.23) 
-0.26*** 
(-4.18) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
Old Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.09 
(-1.32) 
-0.19** 
(-2.28) 
-0.03 
(-0.51) 
Output Gap 
-0.31*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.47*** 
(-5.77) 
-0.51*** 
(-4.09) 
Adjusted R² 0.47 0.89 0.56 
Number of 
Observations 
114 114 114 
(Source: authors’ estimates) 
(( ) = T statistics; *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%) 
(Coefficients robust to heteroskedasticity) 
                                                 
2 For the calculation of the equilibrium current account for industrial and emerging countries, we follow an “in 
sample approach”. The country for which the equilibrium current account is calculated is always included in the 
panel estimation. This approach is in opposition to the “out of sample” method where the country, for which the 
equilibrium current account is computed, is excluded from the panel estimation (Korhonen and Ritola, 2009). 
Especially, China is part of the multinational model with the main developed countries, but its current account 
equilibrium is based on a panel estimation including China and the other emerging countries. 
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Results for emerging countries are less conclusive than those for industrial countries, as in the 
case of other empirical studies (Chinn & Prasad, 2003). The specification has been slightly 
modified on two points. A single dependency ratio (DR) with both child and old population is 
used instead of two separate ones. Life expectancy is smaller in emerging countries and makes 
the old dependency ratio less relevant. The oil products balance (OB) has a larger impact on 
emerging countries’ current account and is introduced as a new explaining variable. Increasing 
oil prices improve oil producers’ current accounts and deteriorate other emerging countries’ 
current accounts. The coefficients are on the whole significant with predicted signs in the 
different specifications (Table 2). A comparison of the specifications for industrial and 
emerging countries with the same variables show that the results (for emerging countries with 
the specification used for industrialized countries) are close from other studies (Jeong et al., 
2010). Country effects raise the determination ratio and reflect strong specificities between the 
emerging countries. Like previously, the panel specification with country fixed effects seems 
the most relevant and is adopted in order to calculate the equilibrium current account.  
 
Table 2. Determinants of current account for emerging countries 
 
 OLS Pooled Individual Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects 
Constant 
8.78*** 
(6.62) 
14.23*** 
(7.11) 
3.85*** 
(2.79) 
Initial Stock of Net 
Foreign Assets 
0.07*** 
(9.88) 
0.06*** 
(6.20) 
0.07*** 
(11.90) 
Dependency Ratio 
-0.11*** 
(-5.45) 
-0.20*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.03 
(-1.60) 
Oil Balance 
0.21*** 
(6.35) 
0.22*** 
(2.65) 
0.19*** 
(6.27) 
Output Gap 
-0.39** 
(-2.49) 
-0.37** 
(-2.49) 
-0.32* 
(-1.86) 
Adjusted R² 0.50 0.57 0.60 
Number of 
Observations 
156 156 156 
(Source: authors’ estimates) 
(( ) = T statistics; *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%) 
(Coefficients robust to heteroskedasticity) 
 
4.2 The simulated equilibrium current balances 
 
For simulating equilibrium current balances, we use the value of initial stocks of net foreign 
asset at the beginning of each four years period’s and four years average values of dependency 
ratios and other variables, but we exclude output gap in order to remove short-term effects. 
Figures 1 to 3 show the observed and equilibrium values of the current account for the main 
emerging countries. 
 
A last correction should be specified. In the FEER theoretical framework, the whole difference 
between observed current balance and equilibrium one must not be interpreted entirely as an 
external disequilibrium. This difference is partly due to delayed effects of exchange rates 
variations that have not yet occurred entirely, but should be taking into account in the 
estimation. This correction is made using the dynamic structure of external trade equations. 
These figures show observed and adjusted current accounts with equilibrium ones. 
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Figure 1: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of China, India and Brazil 
 
  
 
 
(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
 
The BRICs3, the most important emerging countries, are interesting to compare together 
because they have faced contrasted evolutions (figure 1). First, China had an equilibrium 
current account close to zero % of GDP during the 1980s and the first years of 1990s, which 
seems coherent with the policy adopted by Chinese authorities that wanted to avoid the resort 
to large external debt. The structural reforms, which started in 1979, have allowed a progressive 
openness to foreign trade while the productive sector was modernized. During the 1990s the 
openness has accelerated with large inflows of foreign direct investments. Since the mid-1990s, 
the equilibrium current account has increased to reach 2% of GDP in 2008. In this evolution 
the improvement of net external position and the decreasing of the dependency ratio played a 
positive role. On the whole Chinese surpluses have become larger after the second half of the 
1990s in spite of the impact of the Asian crisis after 1998. 
                                                 
3 Among the BRICs, Russia is not examined in our paper due to strong specialization in commodities and to 
statistical problems during the transition period. 
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Second, in India economic reforms have been more limited than in China (Chauvin & Lemoine, 
2005). However accelerated growth and increasing imports have induced large current deficits, 
which reflects a very different economic strategy compared with China. At the beginning of the 
2000s, the improvement of the current account was mainly explained by a slowdown with 
decreasing imports and by rising prices of agricultural exports. It didn’t last and the growth 
recovery combined with the increase of oil prices induced a new huge deficit after 2005. The 
current account equilibrium, largely negative during the 1980s, increased progressively to reach 
zero % of GDP at the middle of the 2000s, mainly thanks to the improvement of the net external 
position and of the dependency ratio. At the end of the 2000s, the equilibrium current account 
decreased to -1% of GDP due to a degradation of the net external position. 
 
Third, Brazil is a last case as current deficits have been far larger than in China and India at the 
beginning of the 1980s (around -8% of GDP, before the debt crisis) and in the second half of 
the 1990s (-4% of GDP, after the success of the Plan Real and the large flow of foreign direct 
investments). The equilibrium current account was highly negative at the beginning of the 
1980s (-6% of GDP), which reflected a growth strategy based on foreign debt, quite different 
from the Chinese and even Indian cases. But it increased regularly up to a level close to 0% in 
the 2000s, mainly thanks to the decline of the dependency ratio. 
 
Figure 2: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of East Asian countries 
 
 
South Korea presents some similar features with the Japanese case with large current surpluses 
in the second half of the 1980s and after the Asian crisis of 1997. The equilibrium current 
account has increased a lot since the 1980s, from around -5% of GDP up to 1% in the 1990s, 
thanks to its increasing net external position and a moderate declining dependency ratio. During 
the 2000s the Korean current account remained close to its equilibrium value (figure 2). 
 
The South East Asian countries present some similarities (figure 2). During the 1980s and 
especially during the 1990s before the financial crisis of 1997-1998, their current accounts have 
often been inferior to their equilibrium values which were close to 0% of GDP in Indonesia and 
Malaysia and negative, but increasing thanks to the decrease of the dependency ratios, in 
Thailand and Philippines. High rates of growth and the resort to foreign debt and FDI can 
explain this configuration. After the Asian crisis and the large devaluations that followed, the 
East Asian countries have accumulated important current surpluses with the export booms. 
During the 2000s these surpluses have decreased, especially in Thailand and, to a less extent, 
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in Indonesia. On the whole, the current accounts remained higher than the equilibrium values 
which were close to 0% of GDP. In Malaysia and Philippines the current surpluses were larger, 
but with increasing equilibrium values due the improvement of their net foreign positions, 
especially in Malaysia. 
 
 
  
  
(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
 
The current account imbalances of Latin American countries are larger and more frequent than 
those observed in East Asia (figure 3). In Mexico and Colombia, after the debt crisis of 1982 
and the following devaluations, the current surpluses didn’t last. Deficits reappeared and 
remained during the 1990s and 2000s, largely under the current account equilibrium. These 
equilibrium values increased sharply from -5% at the beginning of the 1980s up to 0% at the 
end of the 2000s due to the decline of the dependency ratio and to the rising oil prices during 
the 2000s, especially in the Mexican case. 
 
Argentina is a case study. The 1980s were marked by chaotic evolutions with high inflation, 
recurrent depreciation, current deficits and a succession of stabilization plans which failed and 
led to the adoption of the currency board in 1991. During the 1990s current deficits enlarged 
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up to -5% of GDP, well under the equilibrium value, until the crisis of 2002 and the end of the 
currency board. The production’s decline and large depreciation then induced a huge current 
surplus which declined after, but remained above the equilibrium value close to 0% of GDP in 
the 2000s. The increase of the current account equilibrium in Argentina since the 1980s has 
resulted of two opposite trends, a favorable evolution of the dependency ratio and the rising oil 
net exports on one hand, a deterioration of the net foreign assets on the other, which led to 
stabilization around 0% of GDP. 
 
Figure 3: Actual and equilibrium current accounts of Latin American countries 
 
  
  
(Source: authors' calculation, International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook, April 2010) for the observed current 
account as % of GDP, forecast for 2010) 
 
The beginning of the 1980s was marked in Chile, like in many Latin American countries, by 
successive anti-inflation plans in a context of uncertainty following the Mexican crisis of 1982. 
Huge current deficits (around -10% of GDP) characterized that period but were progressively 
reduced in the middle of the 1980s when Chile recovered a steady and more sustainable growth. 
Except during the mess provoked by the Asian and Russian crisis in 1997-1998, current account 
improved and led to increasing surpluses in the 2000s. The equilibrium current account appears 
in line with this trend, permanently negative but increasing from -4% of GDP in 1980 to -2% 
in the 2000s. The decline of the dependency ratio and the improvement of the net foreign 
position explain this evolution. 
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4.3 The estimation of internal equilibrium 
 
The internal equilibrium is defined as the state of full utilization of productive resources, 
without inflation pressures. For sake of simplification, a restrictive approach, limited to the 
measure of the potential output, is adopted. This approach of internal equilibrium seems less 
suited for emerging countries like China or Brazil, where the concepts of potential output and 
full employment raise many problems, particularly because of the extent of regional imbalances 
and hidden underemployment in rural areas (Bouveret et al., 2006). This estimation of output 
gap is simply taken as representative of the degree of deviation of the internal demand (di). It 
must be regarded as a first step. It seems, however, sufficient at this stage mainly because results 
are only slightly sensitive to output gap’s estimates, as we shall see below. 
 
Different methods can be employed in calculating potential production and the corresponding 
output gap. For industrialized countries, we take the values estimated with production function 
by the OECD4. This approach relies on estimated productions functions and a measure of the 
available productions factors in the country. It demands more information and more hypotheses 
regarding economic mechanisms than other simpler approaches, but is less mechanical and is 
theoretically more relevant. 
 
For developing countries, this kind of estimates is not available. So we calculate output gap by 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter on real GDP over the period 1970-20155. However, a study in 
depth on this issue found that output gaps of East Asian countries estimated by several methods 
are similar for the period 1975-2000 (Gerlach & Yiu, 2004). In addition, our sensitivity tests 
show that errors in output gap estimation do not disrupt the whole conclusion. In the case of 
China, an increase of 1% in output gap leads to an increase of less than 1% of undervaluation. 
 
5 Equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments 
 
Although the methodology is basically the same, equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments 
are not estimated in the same way for all the countries. For the main economic partners (the 
U.S.A., China, the Euro area, the U.K., Japan and the Rest of the World), with the internal and 
external equilibriums previously estimated, the multinational model is used six times to produce 
misalignments in terms of real effective exchange rates r = dLogR = dR/R = (R  Re)/Re and 
nominal exchange rate against the dollar e = dLogE = dE/E = (E  Ee)/Ee, each country playing 
successively the role of residual country without its own current account target. The final 
solution is obtained by making an average of the 5 runs in which the current account target of 
each country is included (designated OCI for own country included). This allows determining 
under-valuations (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluations (e < 0 and r < 0) for the dollar, the euro, 
the yen, the yuan, the pound sterling and the Rest of the World’s currency over the period 1982-
2010. 
For the other countries, Korea, India, Brazil, the other East Asian and Latin American countries, 
a simple national model is used for each country and linked to the results of the multinational 
model to obtain misalignments in terms of real effective exchange rates (using relative 
consumption prices) and nominal exchange rate against the dollar. 
For all the emerging countries examined, the following figures show the evolution of the 
observed and equilibrium exchange rate over the period 1982-2010, in real effective and 
                                                 
4 Economic Outlook, OECD, May 2010. 
5 As it is known, this filter has certain disadvantages. It does not define well the output gap at the beginning and 
at the end of samples. It tends to neglect the structural breaks and the regime shifts. For prolonged slowdowns it 
deviates too much from a production function gap. We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a lower smoothing 
parameter than that of industrialized countries to take into account that the business cycle is shorter in emerging  
countries. 
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nominal bilateral against the dollar terms. For all the countries, including the USA, the euro 
area and Japan, tables 5 and 6 in appendix 6 give the under (over)valuation in real effective (r) 
and nominal bilateral terms (e) over the same period. A comparison is also made with other 
approaches in appendix 7. Our results are globally convergent with those of Cline & Williamson 
(2008, 2009 and 2010) with some few divergences which can be explained by differences in 
the equilibrium current account for few countries. 
 
Results are presented in two steps. First, a general assessment of the exchange rate 
misalignments is proposed using a set of potential explanatory variables. Three kinds of 
variables appear especially relevant, the degree of openness, the type of international 
specialization and the exchange rate regime linked to the degree of financial liberalization. 
These results lead to distinguish, in a second step, three groups of countries, the BRICs (except 
Russia) as the main emerging countries with smaller degree of openness, the East Asian 
countries more specialized in manufacturing products and with exchange rate regimes more 
frequently anchored on the dollar and, last, the Latin American countries with more often 
flexible exchange rate regimes and increasing capital account openness. 
 
5.1 A general assessment of exchange rate misalignments 
 
At first glance, exchange rate misalignments may seem to follow rather diverging paths. 
Actually, panel unit root tests conducted on the series of misalignments for the 17 countries on 
the 1982-2008 period show that these series simply follow a stationary process. Furthermore, 
exchange rate misalignments, measured in absolute value, can be explained by three groups of 
variables. 
 
- First, the degree of openness, measured as the half-sum of export and import in percentage of 
the GDP, has a negative impact on the misalignments. Indeed higher trade openness increases 
the impact of a variation of price competitiveness on current account. Consequently, a smaller 
variation of exchange rate is necessary to reach the external equilibrium, which implies smaller 
misalignments. 
 
- Second, the nature of international specialization has a strong influence on the misalignments’ 
amplitude. This can be described through two kinds of indicators, the comparative advantage 
in manufactured goods on one hand, the regional specialization on the other. Higher 
comparative advantages in manufactured goods, like in many East Asian countries, mean 
stronger constraints on firms to preserve competitiveness, compared with the case where 
international trade is more specialized in raw materials, like in many Latin American countries. 
This external constraint limits the amplitude of exchange rate misalignments which can be 
supported at medium term. As a consequence, a negative relation is expected between 
manufacturing comparative advantage and misalignment. Regional specialization, measured as 
the share of exports towards the regional area (East Asia, South America and North America) 
in percentage of total exports, is another explaining variable of misalignments, also with a 
negative impact. Stronger regional integration implies more price competition, which limits 
misalignments. 
 
- Third, exchange rate regime, combined with the degree of financial liberalization, is the last 
set of explaining variables. In a simplified approach, the IMF de jure classification between 
fixed, intermediate and floating regimes can be used. Fixed exchange rates regime leads to 
larger misalignments. Conversely, floating regime limits misalignments. If a value of +1 is 
given to fixed regimes, zero to intermediate ones and -1 to floating regimes, a positive relation 
is expected between the exchange rate regime indicator and the amplitude of misalignment. The 
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relative financial openness, based on a de jure measure of capital account openness (the Chinn-
Ito index, 2008), is the second relevant factor. Higher financial liberalization facilitates 
monetary adjustments, which reduces exchange rates misalignments, while capital controls 
have the opposite effect. A negative relation is therefore expected between the financial 
openness indicator and misalignment. Last, the two previous variables, the exchange rate 
regime indicator and the financial openness, can be combined in a single indicator with a 
positive impact, as their interaction can reinforce each other. A floating regime with financial 
liberalization leads to smaller misalignments, while a fixed regime combined with financial 
liberalization, like in Argentina during the 1990s, induces large misalignments. 
 
On the whole, equation [5] summarizes the different determinants of exchange rate 
misalignments with the variables defined as follow: AERM, absolute exchange rate 
misalignment in real effective terms; OPEN, trade openness measured as the half sum of export 
and import in percentage of GDP; ACRMAN, indicator of comparative advantage in 
manufactured goods, given by the CHELEM databank; XREG, indicator of regional 
specialization, equal to the share of exports towards the associate region, in percentage of total 
exports; ERR, exchange rate regime indicator, equal to +1 for fixed regime, 0 for intermediate 
one and -1 for floating one, according to the de jure IMF classification; RKAOPEN, relative 
financial openness, compared with the weighted world average and based on the Chinn-Ito 
index (2008). 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 *
it i t it it it it it
it it
AERM OPEN ACRMAN XREG ERR RKAOPEN
ERR RKAOPEN
       
 
       
 
   [5] 
 
The equation is estimated with panel data on the 1982-2008 period for the whole emerging and 
industrial countries. The results of unit root tests are presented in appendix 8. The null 
hypothesis of the presence of unit root is rejected for all the series, except for the trade openness 
(OPEN) and the comparative advantage indicator (ACRMAN), which must be written in first 
difference in theory. The estimated coefficients of equation [5] are given in table 3. They are 
all significant with the predicted signs. Country fixed effects estimates are not presented. They 
don’t improve the quality of the adjustment, mainly because countries’ specificities are already 
present in the explanatory variables. 
 
Beyond these first results on the determinants of exchange rate misalignments, analysis can be 
developed at the level of three groups of countries rather homogenous by their characteristics, 
the BRICs (Brazil, India and China) as the largest emerging countries with smaller degree of 
openness, the East Asian countries more specialized in manufactured products and, last, the 
Latin American countries with more often flexible exchange rate regimes and increasing capital 
account openness. 
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Table 3: Determinants of the real effective misalignments in absolute value 
 
 OLS Pooled OLS Pooled 
Constant 
0.24*** 
(34.93) 
0.15*** 
(35.94) 
OPEN 
-0.34*** 
(-20.11) 
- 
Δ(OPEN) - 
-0.26*** 
(-4.67) 
ACRMAN 
-0.0008*** 
(-19.10) 
- 
Δ(ACRMAN) - 
-0.001*** 
(-6.28) 
XREG 
-0.09*** 
(-5.79) 
-0.03*** 
(-3.13) 
ERR 
0.04*** 
(9.36) 
0.03*** 
(17.50) 
RKAOPEN 
-0.01*** 
(-6.80) 
-0.009*** 
(-6.35) 
ERR*RKAOPEN 
0.01*** 
(6.97) 
0.02*** 
(19.50) 
Adjusted R² 0.82 0.91 
Number of cross-
sections 
17 17 
Number of 
Observations 
459 442 
(Source: authors’ estimates) 
(( ) = T statistics; *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%) 
(Coefficients robust to heteroskedasticity) 
 
 
5.2 Estimates of FEER for Brasil, India and China 
 
 
In China the beginning of the 1980s is difficult to interpret due to the mode of regulation of the 
external trade that prevailed at that time. However, the yuan seemed to be overvalued in the 
middle of the 1980s with a massive current account deficit. The introduction of an exchange 
rate determined in the swap centers led to a de facto devaluation that permitted to reverse this 
situation and yuan was even strongly undervalued in 1991 with a significant current surplus in 
a context of an economic slowdown. 
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Figure 4: Actual and equilibrium real effective (left column) and bilateral (right column) exchange 
rates of the Chinese yuan, the Indian rupee and the Brazilian real (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
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Continued devaluations and the increasing usage of the swap centers exchange rate allowed the 
actual exchange rate to keep up with the depreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate and to 
preserve undervaluation during most of the time in a context of degradation of the current 
account and of high inflation, so that in 1994, the year of the unification of the exchange rate 
system, the yuan was even undervalued in nominal and real terms. The second half of the 1990s, 
in particular since 1997, marked a turning point. The economic boom and the return of current 
surplus illustrated the success of the trade openness policy of the past years. This explained the 
revaluation of the equilibrium exchange rate of the yuan during the second half of the 1990s, 
both in nominal and real terms, in sharp contrast with the previous period. The stabilization of 
the yuan against the dollar and even the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the 
yuan meant in fact a persistent undervaluation larger than before, both in nominal and real 
terms. This diagnostic could help to find an explanation of the resistance of the yuan facing the 
Asian crisis of 1997-1998 during which the yuan was already undervalued. However this 
undervaluation has been temporally reduced after the Asian crisis and the large devaluations of 
most of the East Asian competitors. After 2002 the undervaluation of the yuan has been 
amplified against the dollar, up to 47% in 2006. It has been reduced since then, but remained 
high in 2009 (around 22%). Although more moderate at the beginning of the 2000s, the 
undervaluation in real effective terms has increased in the second half of the 2000s (figure 4). 
 
The evolution of the Indian rupee’s exchange rate presents some similarities with the yuan case: 
sharp devaluation until 1994 in real effective terms and until 2002 in bilateral terms against the 
dollar, then stabilization in nominal terms with appreciation in real effective terms. But, beyond 
these rather similar evolutions, the Indian exchange rate policy appears very different. During 
the devaluation period, undervaluation and overvaluation have alternated as in China, but with 
a tendency towards a more marked and durable overvaluation. Current account deficit has been 
permanent and larger in India than in China, with levels frequently under the equilibrium value. 
After the stabilization of the real exchange rate (1994) and of the bilateral one against the dollar 
(2002), the overvaluation in nominal and real terms has been the rule, except during the years 
2001-2003. The opposition between Chinese and Indian exchange rate policies is striking since 
2004, which has a strong impact on the growth model of the two countries. 
 
Brazil has faced quite different issues. It began the period with an overvaluation inherited from 
the development scheme of the 1970s.  After the contagion process of the Mexican crisis of 
1982 a succession of exchange rate adjustments occurred in the framework of orthodox 
programs negotiated with the IMF or heterodox packages adopted in spite of Washington 
institutions’ hostility. Combining crawling peg and, when necessary, maxi-devaluations, Brazil 
maintained a large undervaluation, contributing to a current account close to 0% of GDP, far 
above the equilibrium value, while inflation was speeding up to hyperinflation. The monetarist 
Collor Plan stopped this dynamic in March 1990 but, six months after, inflation resumed its 
race, leading to new transitory stabilization packages, including exchange rate adjustments. 
Consequently, until the adoption of the Real Plan in 1994, real and nominal exchange rates 
continued to be undervalued.  
 
With the adoption of the Real Plan, Brazil focused on price stabilization and gave up its priority 
for competitiveness, stressing on capital flows to balance current deficit. In spite of the success 
of the Plan and some adjustments of a target zone pegged on dollar, inertial inflation entailed 
increasing overvaluation in real and nominal terms  (-76% against the dollar in 1998). Such 
imbalances could not last. At the end of 1998 contagion of the Asian and Russian crises carried 
on a speculative attack against a Brazilian economy mined by macroeconomic imbalances. 
After a 50% devaluation and some adjustments allowed by the adoption of a floating regime, 
the real and nominal exchange rates returned progressively to a level close to the equilibrium 
one at the beginning of the 2000s, while current account became equilibrated. 
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From 2002 to 2007 the real remained close to its equilibrium value in real terms and 
undervalued against the dollar, in spite of an appreciation trend. Current account surpluses were 
obtained thanks to rising raw materials’ prices, dynamic world demand and improvement in 
competitiveness (Salama, 2009). This favorable trend was reflected in an appreciation of the 
equilibrium value of the real, in accordance with the observed appreciation. 
 
With the world crisis, real appreciation and peg to the dollar became more difficult to sustain. 
Real overvaluation and current deficit reappeared, although limited by comparison with what 
has been observed in the past. However, at the end of the 2000s, Brazil, like India, is much 
more constrained by its exchange rate policy, in clear cut with China which uses undervaluation 
of the yuan at the expense of its competitors. 
 
5.3 Estimates of FEER for the East Asian currencies 
 
In Korea, a period of undervaluation of the won during the 1980s, linked to the export growth 
strategy, was followed by a rather marked overvaluation, both in nominal and real terms. But, 
at the opposite of the Japanese case, this occurred after a real depreciation during the first half 
of the 1980s and, then, a stable dollar-won parity. This overvaluation of the won has been 
regarded as one of the factors explaining the Korean crisis in 1997. The sharp devaluation of 
1998 led to a large undervaluation and current surpluses. However this didn’t last, as the won 
appreciated, both against the dollar and in real effective terms, especially against the other East 
Asian currencies. The current account remained in slight surplus, but generally under its 
equilibrium value during most of the 2000s, with a won overvalued in real terms. The 
undervaluation against the dollar was less pronounced than in Japan and the euro area. After 
the burst of the crisis in 2008 the evolution has been at the opposite of the Japanese case, with 
a sharp depreciation, both against the dollar and in real terms, which has allowed preserving a 
nominal undervaluation (figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the won (2000 = 
100) 
 
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
 
Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia present some similarities with respect to exchange rate 
policy during the 1980s. The early 1980s were marked by the end of economic boom with 
current account deficit and overvaluation. The peg to the dollar in the middle of the 1980s 
allowed a real depreciation and an improvement of their current account, leading to an 
undervaluation of their currencies between 1985 and 1988, especially in Philippines and to a 
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less extent in Malaysia where the ringgit was close to its equilibrium value. A reversal took 
place at the end of the 1980s where economic recovery was related to the reappearance of 
important current deficits. The peg to the dollar led to large overvaluation in nominal terms, but 
less in real effective terms. Thailand was the most affected while the phenomenon was less 
marked in Philippines where the growth was more modest and current deficit more contained. 
The Malaysian ringgit remained as before close to equilibrium, as Malaysian economy was 
more trade open, which reduced misalignments’ amplitude (figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the bath, the 
ringgit, the Philippine peso and the Indonesian rupee (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
 
In 1996, at the eve of the Asian crisis, with newly increasing current deficit in Thailand, the 
bath was overvalued (-13% in real terms, -28% against the dollar). The overvaluation was more 
limited in Philippines and even less marked in Malaysia. Except for Thailand where 
overvaluation appeared significant (although more modest than at the start of the 1990s), 
overvaluation does not seem to have been the main cause of the crisis in these East Asian 
countries. The large devaluations following the crisis contributed to the reconstitution of 
important current surpluses in Thailand and Malaysia, but not durably in Philippines. The bath 
and, to a less extent, the ringgit became undervalued, but not the Philippine peso as Philippines 
faced more structural problems at that time. 
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During the 2000s, in spite a general movement of appreciation, the East Asian currencies 
remained undervalued against the dollar (around 20-30 %), but less in real effective terms. 
However, compared with the Chinese yuan, they appeared far less undervalued, which induced 
a bias in the international competition among East Asian countries. Since the beginning of the 
crisis in 2007 the undervaluation has been preserved and even increased in real terms, thanks 
to the peg to the dollar. 
 
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
 
Indonesia, as an oil-exporting country, presents some specificity. The counter-oil shock in 1986 
has degraded its current account, leading to overvaluation of its currency until the middle of the 
1990s. At that time, with sustained growth and current account more under control, 
overvaluation became weak and did not seem to have played a large role in the crisis of 1997. 
However the currency the most affected by the crisis has been the Indonesian rupee, which 
might be explained more by political reasons and other economic imbalances than strictly 
monetary reasons. The devaluation of the Indonesian rupee was of the most important amplitude 
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destructive effects of the crisis on the Indonesian productive system. The situation has been 
progressively normalized afterwards, the country taking advantage of the rising oil prices 
during the 2000s. The undervaluation of the Indonesian rupee (around 20-30% against the 
dollar) was in line with the other East Asian countries at the end of the 2000s, but slightly less 
pronounced in real terms. 
 
5.4 Estimates of FEER for other Latin American currencies 
 
 
Contrary to the East Asian countries, ERM of the Latin American countries are wider and more 
dispersed, due to larger heterogeneity and smaller economic integration between countries. If 
they are all affected by the debt crisis of the 1980s, the financial recovery following the Brady 
Plan in the late 1980s, the speculative crises of the end of the 1990s and the last financial crisis, 
varieties of stabilization and nominal exchange rate policies determine very different 
macroeconomic paths and imbalances. Argentine and Mexican cases are interesting to examine 
first in this perspective. 
 
 
In Argentina, at the beginning of the 1980s, accelerating inflation entailed the overvaluation of 
the peso and large current deficits in spite of the crawling peg regime. After a new stabilization 
package the government adopted the heterodox Austral plan in 1985 aimed to break inflation 
by a policy mix combining prices, wages and exchange rates freezing after a sharp devaluation. 
After a while, the loosening of this policy brought about a return of inflation and overvaluation, 
as the government delayed exchange rate adjustments to fight inflation. 
 
 
A succession of stabilization plans were then implemented with more accommodating exchange 
rate policy aimed to preserve competitiveness, which led to undervaluation of the peso and 
current surplus in 1988 and 1989. But accelerating inflation led the Menem government to 
experiment various packages before the adoption of a more radical program based on a currency 
board in 1991. This led to a sharp real appreciation, huge current deficit and large overvaluation 
between 1992 and the burst of the crisis in 2001. The end of the currency board and the maxi-
devaluation induced a strong reversal with durable undervaluation in nominal terms against the 
dollar (around 30%) during the 2000s and, to a less extent, in real effective terms (from 40% 
down to 5% and up to around 15%) with large current surplus in a favorable context of rising 
oil and commodities prices. Consequently, Argentina faced the last crisis in a better position 
with an undervalued peso and rising current surplus in spite of a moderate appreciation in real 
and nominal terms. However the real undervaluation may be overestimated in the last years, as 
the official statistics of prices used to evaluate real exchange rates are known as underestimating 
the actual rate of inflation (figure 7). 
 
 
Although large, the amplitude of exchange rate’s evolutions is more limited in Mexico than in 
Argentina. The debt crisis originated in Mexico in 1982 led to an inflationary cycle with price 
explosion and strong exchange rate depreciation. Successive failure of stabilization plans 
entailed a dramatic chase between price hikes and exchange rate adjustments allowing however 
a steady undervaluation, both in nominal and real terms with current surplus far above the 
equilibrium value.  
 
The heterodox Pact for economic solidarity of December 1987 combined fiscal adjustment, a 
fixed exchange rate (followed by some slight depreciations), a temporary freeze of wages and 
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prices and strong trade liberalization. The program succeeded in stopping inflation, but residual 
inflation entailed a strong real appreciation and growing current deficits (-6% of GDP between 
1992 and 1994), favored by trade liberalization. An increasing overvaluation appeared, both in 
nominal and real terms.  
 
Figure 7: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates of the Argentine and 
the Mexican pesos (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
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capital flows were portfolio investment flows more reversible. Successive speculative attacks 
(the Tequila crisis in 1995) led to the abandon of the target zone exchange rate regime for 
floating with a large devaluation nominal and real and a dramatic slump. The current balance 
improved strongly and exchange rate became close to its equilibrium value. The large financial 
mobilization of IMF and the USA during the collapse and a successful stabilization package 
helped Mexican economy to recover external credibility and growth. But Mexico was touched 
indirectly by the Asian and Russian crises in 1997-1998 which led the government to devaluate 
by steps. In spite of this, the peso appreciated in real terms and became slightly overvalued in 
real terms and against the dollar until 2002.  
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After a new depreciation against the dollar, the peso remained stable in real terms and close to 
equilibrium, with a progressive improvement of the current account. In 2008 the world crisis 
and the drop of the trade with the USA led to a new decline of the current account and a limited 
overvaluation. The Mexican economy seems in a more balanced situation to face the present 
crisis than in previous periods but its exchange rate policy is more constrained than in other 
emerging countries. 
 
Figure 8: Actual and equilibrium real effective and bilateral exchange rates for Chile and 
Colombia (2000 = 100) 
 
  
  
(Source: authors’ calculations, IFS for bilateral exchange rates, partial data for 2010) 
 
Chile inherited of an imbalanced situation at the beginning of the 1980s with inflation and 
growing current deficit (-15% of GDP in 1981). In spite of a sharp devaluation in 1981 the 
inversion of the capital inflows led to the adoption of floating exchange rate. Large nominal 
and real depreciations followed, but important overvaluation remained until 1987 with 
progressively improving current account. From the end of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s a 
more balanced situation prevailed with stabilized nominal exchange rate, moderate real 
appreciation, limited current deficit and a currency often undervalued in real terms. The Asian 
and Russian crises were destabilizing factors with new imbalances and overvaluations. 
However nominal and real depreciations up to 2003 helped to recover equilibrium exchange 
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rates and to improve current account. Since then, the Chilean economy enjoyed a rather steady 
and sustainable growth with growing current surplus (5% of GDP in 2006-2007), a currency 
appreciating in nominal and real terms while keeping large undervaluation. Although 
negatively affected by the world crisis of 2008, Chile faced it in a rather balanced position in 
spite of its reduced room for manoeuvre (figure 8). 
 
Colombia presents some similarity with Chile in terms of exchange rate profile, a long nominal 
depreciation up to 2002, a real depreciation during the 1980s followed by a more stabilized 
evolution with alternative periods of appreciation and depreciation. But imbalances have been 
far more important with current deficits and overvaluation at the beginning of 1980s, a long 
period of huge surpluses (4% of GDP in 1991) and massive undervaluation (around 40-60% in 
nominal and real terms) up to 1992. Since then, current deficits and large overvaluation have 
been the rule, except a brief improvement in 1999-2000. The Columbian economy faced the 
world crisis of 2008 in a more fragile and unbalanced position. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Some general lessons can be drawn from this estimation of ERM and current account 
imbalances of the emerging countries since the 1980s. 
 
Among the BRICs, the main emerging countries, the exchange rate policy has been contrasted. 
The Chinese case is the most well known. From the 1980s to 1994 the trade openness strategy 
has been based on a depreciation of the yuan in real and nominal terms with alternatively 
periods of under and overvaluation, but preserving more undervaluation and avoiding the 
recourse to external indebtedness. Since the middle of the 1990s a turning point has appeared 
with a permanent yuan undervaluation in real and nominal terms, due to a real revaluation of 
the yuan smaller than the equilibrium exchange rate’s revaluation which resulted from the 
success of the Chinese strategy of openness. This undervaluation has been temporally 
attenuated with the consequences of the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, but it has amplified since 
2002 and remained after the financial crisis of 2007. Chinese surpluses are one of the symptoms 
of the persistent international imbalances. 
 
India has followed a different path, although there are similarities with China in the exchange 
rate’s evolution: long period of real and nominal depreciations, followed at the end of the 1990s 
by a real appreciation and a nominal stabilization. But, during the depreciation period the 
duration of overvaluation has been longer than in China, with current imbalances more 
pronounced. After the stabilization the overvaluation has been almost the rule, with persistent 
current deficits, except for a short period between 2001 and 2003. India didn’t enjoy a 
revaluation of its equilibrium exchange rate as China did, which can be interpreted as a less 
successful policy of liberalization and trade openness. Since the burst of the crisis of 2008 the 
rupee’s overvaluation and current imbalances have amplified, which is rather scarce among 
emerging countries. It means huge overvaluation against the other Asian partners and put 
constraints on the future potential growth of India. 
Brazil is a last case where three different periods can be distinguished. From the beginning of 
the 1980s to the adoption of the Real plan in 1994, a succession of stabilization programs and 
exchange rate adjustments tried to preserve competitiveness through permanent real and 
nominal undervaluation, but with great difficulties in controlling inflation. From 1994 to 2002 
more focus was put on inflation stabilization and less on competitiveness, as foreign capital 
flows financed current deficits. Real and nominal overvaluation was permanent, but gradually 
decreased after 1998 and the return of devaluations. Since 2002 a more balanced situation 
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prevailed with no misalignments in real terms, an undervaluation against the dollar and an 
appreciation of the equilibrium exchange rate which reflected improvement in Brazilian 
competitiveness. But the economic environment deteriorates with the burst of the crisis. 
Undervaluation against the dollar have disappeared and real overvaluation is back, although 
moderately. 
 
East Asian countries, including Korea, have roughly followed the same path in spite of 
inequality in the level of development: real and, often, nominal depreciation until the end of the 
1980s, stabilization against the dollar with, in some cases, real appreciation during the 1990s, 
large devaluations after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 followed, more or less rapidly, by 
revaluation against the dollar and in real terms. There is no general configuration in terms of 
under or overvaluation for all the East Asian currencies during the 1980s and 1990s. Periods of 
undervaluation and overvaluation have alternatively prevailed. Indonesia occupied a specific 
position due to its status of oil producer. The Korean won and Thai baht were more overvalued 
before the Asian crisis of 1997. After the huge devaluations of 1997-1998 the real 
undervaluation didn’t last and misalignments remained limited in real terms, but not against the 
dollar. During the 2000s all the East Asian currencies were undervalued against the dollar, but 
less than the yuan and the yen and more than the euro after its revaluation in the second half of 
the 2000s. Since the burst of the financial crisis of 2008, the undervaluation has been preserved 
against the dollar and amplified in real terms with rising current surpluses, above their 
equilibrium values. This configuration, although less marked than in the Chinese case, 
contributes to the persistence of current imbalances. 
 
Latin American countries have known wider and more dispersed misalignments and current 
imbalances, but nominal stabilization has been observed since the 2000s. Argentina 
experimented three contrasted periods. During the 1980s a succession of stabilization plans 
trying to fight inflation led to overvaluation and was followed by policies more turned towards 
competitiveness, inducing undervaluation, but also high inflation. During the 1990s the 
currency board regime led to huge deficits and overvaluation until the crisis of 2001. After the 
maxi-devaluation, undervaluation against the dollar prevailed, but was less durable in real 
terms. However Argentina faced the world crisis of 2008 in a more comfortable position with 
large surpluses and undervaluation, although the question of the measure of inflation induces 
some uncertainty. 
 
In Mexico three periods can also be considered. The first part of the 1980s was marked by 
stabilization plans which failed, but preserved undervaluation and current surpluses. From 1987 
to the crisis of 1995 more heterodox plans, followed by trade liberalization, succeeded in 
stopping inflation, but entailed large overvaluation and current deficits. Since then, successive 
devaluations limited the overvaluation and the imbalances’ amplitude and led to a progressive 
stabilization. In spite of this, facing the crisis of 2008, the room for manoeuvre of the Mexican 
economy, closely connected with the US, seems relatively limited. 
 
Chile and Colombia present some similarities in their exchange rate evolution, a long nominal 
depreciation up to 2002 and a succession of depreciation and appreciation in real terms. In 
Chile, after an overvaluation period during the first part of 1980s, a more balanced situation 
prevailed in spite of the destabilizing effects of the Asian crisis of 1997 and of the financial 
crisis of 2008. On long period imbalances have been much larger in Colombia and 
overvaluation has tended to amplify during the last crisis. On the contrary Uruguay has reduced 
its overvaluation since the middle of the 2000s. 
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On the whole in 2010, the dollar was still overvalued against all the East Asian currencies, 
except the yen which was close to equilibrium. The undervaluation of the yuan was the largest 
one. The dollar was also overvalued against some Latin American economies (Argentina, Chile 
and Uruguay) which benefited of undervalued currencies in real terms. Brazil and Mexico had 
currencies close to equilibrium against the dollar, but were slightly overvalued in real terms, 
which reduced their room for manoeuvre, especially for Mexico. The euro area, as a whole, was 
also close to equilibrium, but faced mainly huge intra-European imbalances. Last, Colombia 
and, above all, India suffered of overvalued currencies against the dollar and in real terms. 
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Appendix 1: National model in differential logarithmic 
 
National model in logarithmic differentials (x = dLogX = dX / X = (X  Xe) / Xe) is transformed 
into: 
 
  * 1i i i i i ix x d x x r      [6] 
  i i i i i im m di m m r     [7] 
 i i i ipx x r p   [8] 
 i i i ipm m r p   [9] 
   1           i i i petxi xi i i i ib T px x pm m         [10] 
 
The national model variables are defined as follow: X, non-oil exports in volume; D*, world 
demand in volume; P*, world prices; PX, export prices; M, non-oil imports in volume; DI, 
internal demand in volume; PM, import prices; P, production prices; E, bilateral exchange rate 
against the dollar; R, real effective exchange rates; B, current balance; i, interest rates for 
external debt; F, net external debt; Ppet, oil price; Mpet, net oil import; T, ratio of nominal export 
on nominal import; µ, ratio of nominal import on nominal GDP, σpetx = EPpetMpet/PXX is the 
ratio of net oil imports on non-oil exports and σx = iEF/PXX is the ratio of foreign debt service 
on non-oil exports. 
b is the difference between the observed current account and the equilibrium one, as percentage 
of GDP.The way the equation [9] is derived can be explained: 
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We can compute r (equation [1]), the misalignment of “national euro” in real effective terms (r 
= dLogR = dR / R = (R  Re) / Re): 
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By using the equation of the real effective exchange rate, we can find out e, the degree of 
misalignment in bilateral nominal terms (equation [2]); the partner countries’ misalignments 
are given by the previous multinational model: 
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Like in the multinational model, we suppose that 
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We can also compute the effective ERM based on consumer prices (PD) (equation [3]): 
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(pdj, ej, pxj obtained thanks to the multinational model) 
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Appendix 2: Trade elasticities 
 
The elasticities of the MIMOSA model for Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom 
(close to those of Wren-Lewis), those of Dées (1999) for China and those of Hervé (2000) for 
the Euro area are taken for our simulation. The price elasticities are rather in accordance with 
the generally admitted hierarchical position of countries in the world trade. The relatively weak 
value for China could be surprising, but might be explained by the particular nature of the 
Chinese trade. The trade model of China was estimated for the period 1985-1998 and for the 
first half of the 1980s the role of exchange rates in exports and imports is considered as little 
significant. Notice also that Japanese and American exporters turn out to be largely price maker. 
The price elasticities are weaker in the OECD (2005) publication as they concern the total trade 
of goods and services. For the Rest of the World, estimation of elasticities has been made using 
data from CHELEM and OECD. 
 
For emerging countries, studies of Senhadji (1998), Senhadji & Montenegro (1999), Barrel et 
al., (1999), Ito et al. (1996) and of IMF (2000) have been used. For Korea and Thailand Barell’s 
results, close to those of Senhadji, have been taken whereas for Indonesia FMI’s elasticities 
have appeared more significant. For India Senhadji’s results have been used. Two problems 
appeared for Malaysia and Philippines. Import price elasticity of Malaysia estimated by IMF 
seemed too weak while Philippines’ one estimated by Senhadji was very high, especially 
compared with IMF results. For these two countries, mean values obtained for the whole set of 
Senhadji’s emerging countries have been preferred for import price and income elasticities (εm 
= 1.4; ηm = 1.1). Last, for Uruguay also, the import income elasticity appeared too high and a 
smaller value (1.5) has been used.  
 
Country Source x m x m 
Korea 
Barell 
Kim 
2.20 
1.11 
1.20 
0.10 
2.00 
1.29 
1.20 
1.59 
India Senhadji 0.77 1.12 1.55 1.33 
Indonesia 
IMF 
Senhadji 
0.32 
- 
0.68 
1.51 
1.27 
- 
1.66 
0.98 
Malaysia IMF 0.53 0.01 1.86 1.47 
Philippines 
IMF 
Senhadji 
-0.10 
1.22 
-0.75 
2.73 
1.34 
1.19 
1.65 
2.26 
Thailand 
IMF 
Barell 
Senhadji 
0.99 
0.45 
- 
0.75 
0.93 
1.37 
2.73 
2.59 
- 
1.03 
1.59 
1.69 
Argentina Senhadji 0.24 1.07 1.28 1.27 
Brazil Senhadji 1.60 1.81 2.10 1.25 
Chile 
Ito et al. 
Senhadji 
0.10 
0.10 
0.23 
0.02 
2.87 
2.87 
1.70 
1.70 
Colombia Senhadji 1.73 0.78 1.39 1.09 
Mexico 
Senhadji 
Ito et al. 
- 
0.77 
0.79 
1.43 
- 
1.55 
1.32 
1.60 
Uruguay Senhadji 1.77 0.94 0.59 5.54 
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Appendix 3: Sensitivity tests 
 
Considering the existing uncertainties in the estimation of external and internal equilibrium and 
in the measure of trade elasticities, three kinds of sensibility tests have been performed: 
 
 an increase of the target current balance of 1% of GDP (bc); 
 an increase of the potential production of 1% (ye); 
 an increase of the export price elasticity of 20% (εx); 
 an increase of the import price elasticity of 20% (εm). 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity tests on real effective exchange rates (rc) 
 
 bc ye εx εm 
Korea 0.0066 0.0022 0.0014 0.0029 
India 0.0542 0.0021 0.0004 0.0070 
Indonesia 0.0140 0.0143 0.0146 0.0152 
Malaysia 0.0030 0.0157 0.0162 0.0126 
Philippines 0.0127 0.0052 0.0053 0.0063 
Thailand 0.0120 0.0045 0.0043 0.0064 
Argentina 0.0492 0.0169 0.0171 0.0203 
Brazil 0.0365 0.0062 0.0060 0.0150 
Chile 0.0202 0.0037 0.0001 0.0065 
Colombia 0.0468 0.0100 0.0042 0.0110 
Mexico 0.0113 0.0106 0.0046 0.0063 
Uruguay 0.0209 0.0206 0.0072 0.0092 
(Source: authors’ calculations, absolute average of changes from the base simulation results) 
 
Appendix 4: Sources 
 
Variable Source 
CAS World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2010 
ISNFA P.R. Lane and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti’s Database, 2007 
CDR, ODR World population prospect, ONU, Last update, September 28, 2007 
OG 
Economic Outlook, OECD, December 2008 
(for emerging countries, author’s calculations) 
OB, ACRMAN, 
XREG, OPEN 
CHELEM, CEPII’s Database, 2009, 2010 
RKAOPEN 
Chinn and Ito Index 2008,  
World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2010 
ERR Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, IMF  
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Appendix 5: Panel unit root test 
 
Table 5: Panel unit root test for industrialized countries 
 
 Level First Difference 
 IPS IPS 
CA -2.16** -7.87*** 
ISNFA -1.20*** -3.81*** 
CDR -3.83*** -3.98*** 
ODR -11.29*** -8.73*** 
OG -7.65*** -5.99*** 
(Source: authors' calculation) 
(*** = Significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% using the test statistic Im Pesaran Shin; the 
rejection of the null hypothesis (of the presence of unit root), leads us to reject non-stationarity of the series.) 
 
Table 6: Panel unit root test for emerging countries 
 
 Level First Difference 
 IPS IPS 
CA -3.32*** -5.93*** 
ISNFA -2.23** -4.34*** 
DR -2.48*** -4.08*** 
OB -4.08*** -3.62*** 
OG -8.20*** -10.09*** 
(Source: authors' calculation) 
(*** = Significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% using the test statistic Im Pesaran Shin; the 
rejection of the null hypothesis (of the presence of unit root), leads us to reject non-stationarity of the series.) 
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Appendix 6: Undervaluation (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluation (e < 0 and r < 0) (in %) 
 
Table 7: Undervaluation (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluation (e < 0 and r < 0) for the U.S., the, Euro 
area, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Colombia (in %) 
 
 Nominal Bilateral Real Effective 
 EU JPN BRA ARG MEX CHI COL US EU JPN BRA ARG MEX CHI COL 
1982 2.8 -3.0 -28.1 -44.3 32.8 -39.9 -30.2 13.8 8.0 4.9 -33.8 -49.2 22.9 -42.1 -34.7 
1983 14.1 1.2 60.3 -31.0 75.4 2.5 -27.3 7.4 15.2 5.2 37.1 -49.2 52.2 -15.9 -43.6 
1984 18.2 10.3 66.9 -35.2 63.8 -30.6 -4.8 -3.9 12.2 5.5 57.1 -53.3 40.9 -43.3 -23.2 
1985 27.4 18.9 66.7 8.2 41.2 -51.5 12.8 -7.4 19.1 14.1 43.2 0.9 31.5 -49.5 5.1 
1986 33.2 21.0 59.0 -24.7 29.1 -5.5 62.9 -7.8 21.0 11.0 43.0 -36.8 13.7 -16.6 44.9 
1987 21.6 17.3 64.2 -41.2 37.5 24.0 61.3 -9.3 11.0 6.9 54.0 -46.3 27.1 13.3 48.9 
1988 5.3 -2.0 50.4 11.8 1.6 22.3 53.4 5.3 9.5 1.9 51.4 14.3 4.1 20.6 51.0 
1989 5.1 -2.7 37.4 47.8 -6.6 8.7 44.3 9.6 11.7 4.1 42.1 51.4 -0.2 11.7 45.9 
1990 -3.4 0.2 15.9 53.2 -2.4 4.5 57.0 15.1 1.2 4.3 21.0 57.4 3.3 8.6 56.7 
1991 -22.1 -4.9 9.7 -8.5 -20.7 6.6 46.6 23.6 -10.6 6.1 25.5 8.3 -2.2 20.1 58.4 
1992 -23.6 -5.6 17.3 -63.7 -38.5 -2.6 49.0 19.2 -10.0 6.5 34.8 -41.6 -14.8 14.3 61.7 
1993 -7.1 -8.8 -2.0 -74.4 -34.4 -31.9 -37.8 11.1 4.5 1.8 13.3 -54.2 -15.0 -11.9 -18.6 
1994 -5.5 -2.5 7.2 -69.2 -21.5 -2.5 -45.6 7.1 -3.4 -0.8 4.1 -66.1 -19.9 -4.4 -42.4 
1995 -6.6 -10.6 -38.7 -36.8 -1.2 -0.6 -53.7 8.5 1.2 -3.4 -27.5 -25.5 6.4 7.1 -38.5 
1996 -5.6 -14.7 -53.3 -38.4 -6.2 -16.3 -54.7 3.7 4.2 -4.7 -44.6 -29.9 -0.6 -8.3 -42.9 
1997 -3.4 -10.2 -65.4 -62.2 -15.6 -23.2 -68.7 0.0 3.5 -2.7 -51.9 -47.4 -4.6 -10.6 -51.8 
1998 -6.7 -10.7 -76.4 -75.9 -18.6 -30.4 -58.0 -1.5 0.6 -2.8 -61.9 -59.1 -6.4 -15.8 -41.9 
1999 -3.8 -14.3 -59.2 -72.6 -9.9 9.3 12.5 -4.3 2.0 -8.9 -52.4 -64.5 -6.0 8.7 12.8 
2000 3.6 -2.1 -44.4 -38.7 -2.8 3.5 16.8 -13.0 0.1 -5.0 -45.8 -40.5 -6.6 -2.1 9.7 
2001 11.8 2.3 -39.3 -15.4 -6.3 0.5 -8.2 -11.0 6.8 -1.4 -39.6 -18.6 -8.6 -3.7 -11.3 
2002 15.2 9.7 -3.4 56.3 -2.0 7.0 -10.4 -16.3 6.6 2.4 -10.8 43.7 -8.4 -1.6 -16.5 
2003 15.1 15.9 13.0 40.8 4.4 8.7 0.2 -17.7 2.2 4.0 2.0 26.7 -5.3 -2.1 -9.2 
2004 22.5 23.3 25.7 23.7 13.1 37.0 7.4 -23.7 6.0 7.3 7.0 4.8 -3.9 14.5 -9.1 
2005 23.0 32.3 29.7 37.2 18.8 40.9 7.8 -31.0 0.1 8.8 5.1 11.0 -4.0 12.8 -14.1 
2006 23.4 35.7 31.1 45.6 24.8 62.1 10.0 -32.6 -0.9 10.1 4.5 16.4 -1.0 28.9 -13.6 
2007 11.1 26.9 15.7 33.6 16.3 47.0 -10.2 -22.9 -3.4 10.8 0.3 14.6 0.1 24.2 -22.3 
2008 11.8 22.0 8.3 31.4 21.1 18.0 -3.5 -23.6 -4.5 5.2 -8.4 11.4 -8.2 0.2 -17.9 
2009 7.2 6.4 5.0 24.2 8.8 25.5 4.5 -9.9 -2.0 -5.1 -5.1 11.9 -1.2 12.0 -5.2 
2010 8.8 8.2 -7.5 19.4 3.9 12.0 -26.3 -11.0 -1.0 -3.8 -17.6 7.2 -5.5 0.7 -33.0 
(Source: authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
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Table 8: Undervaluation (e > 0 and r > 0) or overvaluation (e < 0 and r < 0) for China, India, 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia (in %) 
 
 Nominal Bilateral Real Effective 
 CHN IND KOR THA MYS PHI INS CHN IND KOR THA MYS PHI INS 
1982 29.9 10.3 17.2 26.2 -32.7 -28.7 -44.9 33.7 2.9 7.5 15.6 -24.8 -30.2 -45.8 
1983 25.6 19.6 26.8 -27.2 -19.4 3.1 -49.8 25.4 4.1 8.3 -34.1 -22.5 -10.4 -57.1 
1984 12.9 23.8 21.2 -7.1 5.0 45.3 -1.6 5.7 7.9 3.6 -18.4 -7.6 25.1 -15.2 
1985 -42.6 -5.1 8.1 -9.3 -3.0 46.3 -16.8 -48.7 -10.7 1.0 -12.9 -6.6 34.7 -21.0 
1986 -1.1 -1.3 25.2 26.2 3.7 73.6 -37.3 -15.2 -11.0 10.6 12.5 -5.3 53.6 -42.7 
1987 27.2 -5.1 25.4 6.1 15.5 38.0 -8.3 13.0 -10.7 14.0 -0.3 5.5 26.2 -12.5 
1988 -12.3 -21.9 16.0 -16.4 1.9 22.2 -18.5 -8.2 -18.2 14.0 -9.5 2.6 19.8 -13.8 
1989 -26.0 -21.9 -7.8 -24.3 -9.6 -9.6 -18.7 -18.6 -15.9 -1.9 -12.9 -1.6 -3.3 -11.6 
1990 25.2 -22.4 -15.5 -50.3 -12.4 -23.9 -25.8 27.3 -18.0 -9.0 -30.2 -2.9 -15.2 -18.7 
1991 15.0 -0.6 -26.9 -47.7 -26.9 -8.2 -34.3 24.9 10.6 -11.2 -22.1 -2.5 3.2 -18.4 
1992 -5.3 12.0 -23.9 -36.6 -21.7 -15.0 -22.3 7.4 23.8 -7.7 -14.1 -0.7 -0.5 -7.1 
1993 -33.7 13.8 -22.3 -32.6 -22.0 -33.8 -18.5 -21.0 27.0 -5.5 -10.5 -0.6 -12.6 -2.8 
1994 17.3 25.1 -11.6 -15.5 -8.9 -14.2 -2.1 18.6 19.9 -12.3 -12.5 -3.6 -12.3 -5.1 
1995 -7.4 -3.2 -19.7 -26.8 -17.8 -15.1 -16.5 0.8 4.8 -8.5 -9.5 -0.4 -3.9 -6.6 
1996 -9.9 -4.1 -29.9 -27.5 -8.1 -18.9 -9.0 0.7 1.6 -18.6 -13.3 -0.6 -8.5 -2.7 
1997 7.1 2.2 -19.8 -4.4 -8.6 -16.8 11.9 14.5 9.2 -9.3 1.9 -0.6 -5.3 16.5 
1998 7.4 -15.0 11.4 20.5 0.5 -1.1 28.3 16.0 -6.3 15.0 17.9 1.3 3.8 27.6 
1999 1.8 3.5 1.8 16.9 6.9 -11.9 2.0 8.5 5.4 3.2 11.9 1.4 -6.1 3.8 
2000 8.8 -2.0 -3.1 13.8 7.5 -1.5 14.1 6.1 -5.8 -5.9 4.4 -1.2 -4.1 8.0 
2001 5.2 13.7 -4.2 6.5 0.8 -3.4 20.6 1.0 9.7 -5.9 0.8 -2.1 -4.5 14.6 
2002 16.4 30.6 0.7 10.4 6.2 3.0 20.1 7.1 21.4 -5.5 0.5 -2.3 -3.5 11.0 
2003 23.0 29.1 6.7 16.9 14.4 8.4 22.9 8.4 17.6 -2.7 2.7 -0.4 -1.7 11.7 
2004 25.1 15.4 22.6 23.1 23.8 20.5 19.5 7.1 -2.6 2.7 1.1 -0.8 0.2 0.9 
2005 41.8 2.1 23.0 16.0 33.2 26.1 24.3 15.9 -21.3 -2.8 -5.7 -0.2 -1.0 -1.8 
2006 47.4 14.7 21.5 30.0 37.0 32.6 38.2 19.2 -12.0 -5.7 -0.4 0.5 1.9 8.5 
2007 38.6 9.9 15.6 34.6 29.9 28.4 32.2 21.2 -8.1 -3.1 7.0 1.7 5.5 11.1 
2008 34.5 -0.9 16.5 24.8 34.5 23.8 25.8 16.2 -17.2 -2.4 1.5 4.4 2.6 4.9 
2009 22.4 -3.8 19.5 28.8 20.2 25.0 25.7 10.8 -12.9 5.8 10.5 3.5 9.8 12.2 
2010 23.8 -4.6 11.3 16.4 16.6 19.0 26.7 11.4 -14.6 -0.6 2.8 2.0 5.2 12.8 
(Source: authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
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Appendix 7: Comparison with other approaches 
 
We compare our own misalignments’ estimations with other approaches using FEER or BEER 
methodology. First, a comparison with Cline’s estimates is interesting as, in both cases, the 
FEER framework is used. Cline’s model has 35 countries, a simpler analysis of the foreign trade 
for each country and no structural approach of the equilibrium current account. Instead, it is 
simply supposed that external imbalances should not exceed 3% of GDP (in absolute value) in 
the medium term, which allows building a scenario of current account targets for the 30 non-
oil exporting countries. 
 
Table 9: Comparison with Cline’s  OCI estimates (in %) 
 
 Real Effective Nominal Bilateral 
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
 Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline Our’s Cline 
USA -23.6 -7.8 -9.9 -5.7 -11.0 -7.8 - - - - - - 
China 16.2 12.6 10.8 29.6 11.4 13.5 34.5 23.4 22.4 40.7 23.8 24.2 
India -17.2 -2.1 -12.9 -12.0 -14.6 -1.8 -0.9 7.3 -3.8 -1.5 -4.6 7.7 
Brazil -8.4 -0.4 -5.1 -27.8 -17.6 -5.9 8.3 5.8 5.0 -15.4 -7.5 0.0 
Korea -2.4 -2.0 5.8 -16.5 -0.6 -1.8 16.5 10.0 19.5 -3.0 11.3 9.5 
(Source: Cline, 2008; Cline and Williamson, 2008, 2009, 2010; authors’ calculations, forecast for 2010) 
(A positive number indicates an undervaluation. Conversely, a negative number indicates an overvaluation) 
 
Our results are close to those of Cline, in real effective terms, with some divergence regarding 
the dollar in 2008, which can be understood, but has an incidence on all the estimated nominal 
bilateral misalignments against the dollar (table 7). This discrepancy in 2008 is mainly 
explained by differences in the US current account target. In a previous estimation for 2008, 
we had a target close to -3% of GDP (as in Cline’s work) and results gave a more limited 
overvaluation of -11.1 % for the dollar in 2008. However, the actual estimation with an 
overvaluation of -24% seems plausible as the US current deficit was still -5% of GDP in 2008. 
For 2009 and 2010, the results are very close.  
For emerging countries, the results are globally convergent, on the whole period, with some 
exceptions which can be explained by differences in the current account targets. For example, 
our estimates give more overvalued currency for India relatively to those of Cline. For this 
country, Cline uses a target of -3 % of GDP. Conversely, our econometric estimates give a 
target of -1 %, which increases overvaluation since the current account target is relatively 
higher. 
 
At first glance, except for two main countries, India and Brazil, and some specific periods, the 
FEER and BEER’s misalignments present large similarities. On the whole, BEERs’ 
misalignments are more important than FEERs’ ones, which is consistent with the long run 
nature of the equilibrium in the BEER approach6. 
This diagnosis can be completed by two indicators, the absolute average deviation (equal to the 
average difference between FEERs and BEERs) and the correlation coefficient between 
misalignments given by both approaches. The absolute average deviation is equal to 16% for 
all the countries, but is smaller for two third of them. Similarly, the correlation coefficient is 
above 0.5 for two third of the countries (table 8). The FEER and BEER give more divergent 
estimations for the three main emerging countries, China, Brazil and India, but are more 
convergent for industrialized countries and also for Mexico, Chile, Malaysia and Indonesia.    
                                                 
6 The series of BEERs’ misalignments come from Béreau, Lòpez-Villavicencio and Mignon (2010).  
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Table 10: FEER and BEER matrix  
 
  Absolute average deviation 
  Below Average Above Average 
Correlation 
Above 50 % 
USA, Euro area, Japan, Mexico, 
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Chile  
Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay 
Below 50 % UK, Philippines, Thailand  China, Brazil, India  
 
For a better understanding of the FEER and BEER divergence, it can be recalled that the BEER 
is rather stable in the long run and, consequently, BEERs’ misalignments are mainly deviations 
between real exchange rates and an average value. Generally, real appreciation above this mean 
value leads to overvaluation and, inversely, real depreciation leads to undervaluation. On the 
opposite, the FEER is linked to a rather stable current account balance. FEERs’ misalignments 
reflect mainly deviations between observed and equilibrium current balance. Generally, a rising 
current account above the equilibrium value leads to undervaluation and, inversely, a decreasing 
current account leads to overvaluation. Consequently, FEER and BEER misalignments are 
consistent when real exchange rate and current account are closely connected. As an illustration, 
we calculate the linear correlation coefficient between current account and real effective 
exchange rate. When the correlation is strong, the misalignments computed by the FEERs and 
BEERs follow the same path. 
 
Appendix 8: Panel unit root test for the determinants of the real effective misalignments 
in absolute value 
 
 Level First Difference 
 IPS IPS 
AERM1 -6.42*** -18.08*** 
ERM2 -6.62*** -14.99*** 
OPEN 4.62 -12.25*** 
ACRMAN 3.80 -12.60*** 
XREG -2.15** -2.97*** 
RKAOPEN -12.45*** -13.00*** 
EER -5.13*** -6.46*** 
(Source: authors' calculation) 
(*** = Significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% using the test statistic Im Pesaran Shin; the 
rejection of the null hypothesis (of the presence of unit root), leads us to reject non-stationarity of the series.) 
Notes: (1) The acronym AERM stands for the absolute value of exchange rate misalignment in real effective terms. 
Notes: (2) The acronym ERM stands for exchange rate misalignment in real effective terms. 
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